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Introduction
Recent attempts to repeal the Glass-Steagall
Act, which would allow commercial banking to
mix with investment banking, have again initi-
ated debate over current regulation prohibiting
the affiliation between banking and commerce.
Although participants in that debate have put
forward many arguments based on U.S. histori-
cal experience, international evidence, and
research results, the debate remains unsettled.
There is no consensus as to the extent of the
affiliation between banks and nonfinancial firms
throughout American history. In some cases, this
lack of consensus is the result of differing defini-
tions of banking and commerce. In other cases,
it results from considering different ways
through which the corporate affiliation between
banks and firms can be implemented. Still in
other cases, the difference results from the use
of like terminology, “mixing banking with com-
merce,” to indicate two different ways to imple-
ment the affiliation—for a bank to own a stake
in a firm, or for a firm to own a stake in a bank.
As we will see, each of these two forms of affili-
ation has been subject to different regulations.
Therefore, using either one of them as a basis
for measuring the association between banking
and commerce will lead to different conclusions.
Any dividing line between banking and com-
merce is bound to be imprecise. The legal defi-
nition of banking itself has changed over time
and has been subject to many interpretations.
Throughout this article, the term banking is
used to denote commercial banking in its sim-
plest form; therefore, a bank is defined as a firm
that accepts demand deposits and makes loans.
This allows, when necessary, a distinction be-
tween commercial banking and investment
banking, which includes activities such as bro-
kerage and securities underwriting. Commerce
is used to denote all nonfinancial firms—that is,
commercial and industrial firms. The article
assumes that the association between banks
and firms may be implemented (1) through one
party undertaking the other party’s activity in-
house; (2) through one party’s investment in
the capital of the other party; or (3) through a
parent company, such as a bank holding com-
pany (BHC), which owns a stake in both a
bank and a firm.1
n 1 The case where an investor, rather than a corporation, owns a
stake in a bank and in a firm is also sometimes considered as a way to mix
banking with commerce. This form of association at the personal level is
not considered here. See Huertas (1986) for examples of investors in the
United States with simultaneous controlling interests in banks and in nonfi-
nancial firms.
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that, traditionally, U.S. banking regulations have
not allowed banks to enter commerce, though
there have been significant exceptions to this
separation at different points in time. Regula-
tion of firms’ ownership of banks is very recent,
beginning only with the passage of the Bank
Holding Company Act (BHCA) in 1956. When
comparing current U.S. regulations on the affili-
ation between banks and firms to those in force
abroad, the article finds that other countries’
regulations are significantly more liberal. How-
ever, an analysis of banks’ investments in equi-
ties in these countries shows that such invest-
ments account for a small fraction of banks’
total assets.
As in the past, the most recent debate on
whether banks should be permitted to affiliate
with firms has focused on the potential implica-
tions of that affiliation for the banking sector
and the safety net.2 There has also been a
great deal of interest in the discussion of how
these implications would vary with the organi-
zational forms adopted by banks to implement
the affiliation.3 The potential effects of that
affiliation on other segments of the economy,
such as nonfinancial firms, have been largely
ignored, yet they are of considerable impor-
tance. Despite recent research on the design of
financial systems, our understanding of the
implications associated with different financial
systems is far from complete. Nonetheless, as
we will see, there is a segment of that research
that is particularly timely for the ongoing
debate. This research has focused on the impli-
cations for borrowing firms resulting from
banks’ owning equity positions in these firms.
The paper proceeds as follows: The next
section summarizes the regulations on banks’
investments in firms and those on firms’ invest-
ments in banks throughout American history.
Section II compares the current U.S. regulations
with those in force abroad and discusses the
extent of banks’ investments in equities in sev-
eral countries. Section III reviews the literature
dealing with the implications of banks’ invest-
ments in nonfinancial firms. Section IV ends the






Although the debate on the association
between banks and nonfinancial firms prior to
the National Banking Act of 1864 still contin-
ues, since then, and in particular after the pas-
sage of the BHCA in 1956, the law has dictated
the separation of banking from commerce.4 In
the past, the regulation of firms’ ownership of
stakes in banks was not as restrictive as that of
banks’ ownership of stakes in firms. With re-
spect to the current U.S. banking regulations,
they allow firms to make limited investments in
banks, but not to control them. That regulation
also prohibits banks from making investments
in firms, but allows BHCs to make such invest-
ments within certain limits.
Nonfinancial Firms’
Investment in Banks
Restrictions on nonfinancial firms’ investment in
banks first appeared in American banking regu-
lation in 1956 with the BHCA. Until then, any
commercial or industrial firm could be the sole
owner of a bank. The primary restrictions on
the ownership of banks before the BHCA were
not directed at firms. One of these restrictions
was defined in the National Banking Act of
1864 and prohibited a bank from owning
shares in another bank. Another restriction was
defined in section 20 of the Glass-Steagall Act
and prohibited any firm “principally engaged”
in the investment banking business from affili-
ating with member banks.5
There are many examples of firms owning
banks throughout American history. Firms’ own-
ership of banks goes as far back as 1799, when
the Manhattan Company was chartered to sup-
ply New York City with fresh water. That com-
pany entered the business of banking by creat-
ing the Bank of the Manhattan Company, which
it operated as a subsidiary. Likewise, in 1954 the
Transamerica Corporation controlled banks in
five western states and owned subsidiaries
engaged in various nonbanking activities.6
n 2 See Huertas (1988), Mester (1992), or Saunders (1994) for a
review of the arguments at the center of the debate.
n 3 Some of the issues in that discussion have also been present in
the debate over the organizational forms that banks should be allowed to
adopt to combine commercial banking with investment banking. See
Santos (1998a) for an extensive discussion of these issues in the context
of the commercial–investment banking debate and Cumming and Sweet
(1987) for a comparison of the predominant organizational forms adopted
in the G-10 countries to integrate banking with commerce.
n 4 See Shull (1983), Huertas (1986), Fein and Faber (1986), and
Blair (1994) for an analysis of the association between banking and com-
merce in American banking history.
n 5 An additional constraint, though not very restrictive, of the Bank-
ing Act of 1933 was to require corporations owning more than 50 percent
of one or more member banks to apply to the Federal Reserve for a permit
to vote their stock.
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With respect to the current restrictions on
firms’ investments in banks, they are deter-
mined by three definitions contained in the
BHCA of 1956 and its subsequent 1966 and
1970 amendments. They define a BHC, a bank,
and the powers of a BHC, respectively. When
the BHCA was enacted in 1956, it defined a
BHC as any company that controlled two or
more banks. Therefore, single BHCs were
exempted. Not surprisingly, many single BHCs
were established and their number continued
to grow until 1970, when the BHCA was
amended to end the loophole. The BHCA states
that a company controls another company if it
(1) has direct or indirect ownership, control, or
power to vote 25 percent or more of any class
of voting securities of that company; (2) is able
in any manner to elect a majority of the direc-
tors of that company; or (3) is able to exercise,
directly or indirectly, a controlling influence
over that company as determined by the Board.
That definition, therefore, allows firms to make
noncontrolling investments of up to 25 percent
of the voting shares of a bank.
As expected, the definition of a bank has also
played a key role in the regulations that sepa-
rate banking from commerce. As mentioned
above, the Glass-Steagall Act prohibition against
firms “principally engaged” in investment bank-
ing owning banks applied only to member
banks—that is, all national banks and the state
banks that chose to be members of the Federal
Reserve System. The BHCA of 1956, however,
adopted a broader definition of a bank: “[A]ny
national banking association or any state bank,
savings bank or trust company” was considered
a bank. The 1966 amendment to the BHCA
redefined a bank as any institution that accepted
demand deposits. The 1970 amendment again
redefined banks, this time as any firm that “(1)
accepts deposits that the depositor has a legal
right to withdraw on demand, and (2) engages
in the business of making commercial loans.” As
a result of this last definition, any institution that
offered one service but not the other would not
be classified as a bank.7 Such firms became
known as “nonbank banks” and were owned by
many different corporations. This led to yet
another redefinition of banks in the Competitive
Equality Banking Act of 1987 as an institution
that is either insured by the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation or offers demand
deposits (or transaction accounts) and makes
commercial loans.8
Finally, the BHCA restricted BHCs’ powers to
the business of banking and to some banking-
related activities. The act contained a list of sev-
eral nonbanking businesses that BHCs could
offer and directed the Board to authorize any
other nonbanking activities. The 1970 amend-
ment, however, requires these nonbanking
activities to be “closely related to banking” and
for their provision by BHCs or their subsidiaries
to produce public benefits that outweigh possi-
ble adverse effects.9
In sum, a nonfinancial firm in the United
States may make equity investments in banks
and BHCs, but they cannot control these insti-
tutions. More specifically, nonfinancial firms
cannot own more than 25 percent of a bank or
a BHC because they would themselves become
BHCs. As for the BHCs, they can be involved in




Throughout American banking history, banks
were not permitted to own nonfinancial firms.
There were, however, notable exceptions to
this rule. Shull (1983) argues that the U.S. pol-
icy of prohibiting banks from owning firms
originated in the 1694 House of Commons Act
establishing the Bank of England. That act
defined the powers of the Bank of England and
included a clause explicitly prohibiting the
Bank from dealing in merchandise.
The charters of early U.S. banks did not
always define the business of banking or bank
powers. There were, however, banks whose
charters included clauses mimicking that of the
Bank of England. Examples of such banks
include the Bank of North America, established
in 1781 as the first incorporated bank in the
United States; the Bank of New York, estab-
lished in 1784; and the First and Second Banks
n 6 See Huertas (1986) and Shull (1994) for more examples of firms
that owned banks at various times in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
n 7 Some institutions, for example, continued to offer demand
deposits, but restricted their extension of commercial credit to the pur-
chase of money-market instruments such as commercial paper. Other firms
avoided that definition of banks by offering NOW (negotiable orders of
withdraw) accounts instead of demand deposits. NOWs  are similar to
demand deposits, with the difference that they require prior notice before
the customer can withdraw the money.
n 8 The nonbank banks established at the time were grandfathered,
with the restriction that their assets could not grow more than 7 percent in
any 12-month period. See Mester (1992) and Shull (1994) for several
examples of nonbank banks.
n 9 See Pollard, Passaic, Ellis, and Daly (1988) for a detailed pre-
sentation of U.S. banking law and the list of nonbanking activities allowed
by the Board.
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of the United States, established in 1791 and
1816, respectively.
With time, bank charters increasingly detailed
the powers of banks. One of the first definitions
of the “business of banking” appeared in 1825
in the charter of the Commercial Bank of Al-
bany. It included a detailed list of the bank’s
powers and a clause requiring the bank to have
“no other powers whatsoever,” implicitly pro-
hibiting the bank from dealing in merchandise.
This definition was later included in the New
York Free Banking Act of 1838, which opened
banking to the general public, and it influenced
the banks’ powers clause of the National Bank-
ing Act of 1864, which established the national
banking system. 
The National Banking Act allowed national
banks to offer “all such incidental powers as
shall be necessary to exercise the business of
banking.” The act listed the explicit powers
available to banks and gave the Comptroller
of the Currency the authority to determine the
activities that were incidental to the business
of banking. Since its enactment, the act’s pow-
ers clause has been the subject of much
debate and interpretation. In litigation, it was
determined that national banks could accept
corporate stock as collateral or payment for
debt (in this case, they could hold the stock
only for a limited period of time), but they
could not deal in or purchase stock as an
investment.10 In addition, banks could not
engage in the operation of a business, even if
it had been acquired in satisfaction of a debt.
Therefore, the National Banking Act extended
in time the prohibition of the early bank char-
ters against dealing in merchandise.
Throughout American history there were,
however, periods of time when banks were
permitted to enter commerce. For example,
there is evidence that during the second quarter
of the nineteenth century—a period that
became known as the “free” or “wildcat” bank-
ing era—banks in some states, such as Con-
necticut, Michigan, New Jersey, South Carolina
and Texas, received charters allowing them to
combine banking with many other nonbanking
activities. There is also evidence of banks mix-
ing with commerce after the enactment of the
National Banking Act in 1864. When the act was
enacted, it was believed that state-chartered
banks would convert to national charters. But
while a national charter did confer greater pres-
tige and competitive advantage in terms of note
issuance (state-chartered banks had to pay
taxes on the notes they issued), state charters
allowed broader powers. California, for exam-
ple, allowed its banks to enter commerce.
Another instance in which banking mixed with
commerce occurred during the post–Civil War
period through private banks. These were
unincorporated banks that did not issue notes
and were free to pursue any activity. Although
they were referred to as banks, many states
prohibited them from using the name “bank.”
Private banks combined commercial banking
with many other activities, including brokerage,
securities underwriting, and commerce. With
the passage of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1933,
some private banks opted to terminate their
deposit-taking activities in order to continue
their nonbanking activities. Some of them went
on to become leaders in the investment bank-
ing business in the United States.11
Current regulation prohibits banks from
making investments in nonfinancial firms. As
mentioned above, the National Banking Act 
of 1864 has been interpreted as prohibiting na-
tional banks from making such investments.
This prohibition has also been extended to
state member banks. State nonmember banks
are usually limited to investments that are per-
missible for national banks, but there are
exceptions which vary with the state in which
they are chartered.12 Finally, with respect to
BHCs, as noted before, the BHCA restricts
them to the business of banking and to some
banking-related activities. Because of this,
BHCs have only been allowed to make invest-
ments in nonfinancial firms that do not account
for more than 5 percent of the firm’s outstand-
ing voting shares.13
In conclusion, banks in the United States in
general have not been allowed to make invest-
ments in the capital of nonfinancial firms. There
n 10 See James (1995) for a characterization of the conditions under
which banks can accept corporate stock for payment of debt claims when
the borrower is in financial distress.
n 11 See Fein and Faber (1986) for examples of banks that combined
banking with nonbanking activities during the free banking era, and for
examples of private banks that mixed banking with nonbanking businesses.
n 12 See Halpert (1988) for some examples of these exceptions.
n 13 In addition to the restrictions emanating from the banking law, it
is usually argued that the legal doctrine of equitable subordination reduces
banking organizations’ incentive to make equity investments in firms. This
doctrine, which is in force in the United States and the United Kingdom,
reduces a bank’s incentive to take an equity position in a firm to which it
has extended loans, because the exercise of control rights associated with
its equity stake may lead to a loss of the bank’s legal status as a creditor in
the event of bankruptcy. See Prowse (1990) and Roe (1990) for a character-
ization of the doctrine and Kroszner (1998) for a discussion of its implica-
tions for banking organizations.
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were, however, periods of time when certain
banks were granted permission to do so and
other occasions when they were able to com-
bine banking with commerce by developing
substitutes for banks. As for the current regula-
tion, it prohibits banks from investing in nonfi-
nancial firms and it only allows BHCs to make





Not all countries regulate the association
between banking and commerce as restrictively
as the United States. The difference is particu-
larly striking in the case of the regulations on
banks’ investment in equities of nonfinancial
firms. As this section will show, most of the
countries reviewed here allow banking and
commerce to mix. However, the data available
indicate that, on an aggregate basis, shares and
participations represent a small fraction of for-
eign banks’ assets.
T A B L E 1
Regulations on Nonfinancial Firms’
Ownership of Commercial Banks
Austria Complies with EC Second Banking Directive.a
Belgium Complies with the EC Second Banking Directive.a
However, the Banking and Finance Commission
examines the “fit and proper” character of those
shareholders holding at least 5 percent of the
bank’s capital.
Canada No shareholder may own more than 10 percent
of a bank’s outstanding shares.
Denmark Complies with the EC Second Banking Directive.a
However, a firm may not have an interest that
allows a decisive influence on the bank.
Finland Complies with the EC Second Banking Directive.a
However, the firm cannot vote at an annual
meeting with more than 5 percent of the total
voting rights present at the meeting.
France Complies with the EC Second Banking Directive.a
Germany Complies with the EC Second Banking Directive.a
Greece Complies with the EC Second Banking Directive.a
Ireland Advance notification is required for any applica-
tion of more than 5 percent of the voting rights
in a bank, and prior approval is required for any
application of 10 percent or more of the total
shares or voting rights or any holding or interest
that confers a right to appoint or remove direc-
tors.
Italy Persons who engage in significant business activ-
ity in sectors other than banking and finance are
forbidden from acquiring an equity stake which,
when added to that already held, would result in a
holding exceeding 15 percent of the voting capital
of a bank or in the control of a bank.
Japan Total investment is limited to firms’ capital or
net assets. The Anti-Monopoly Law prohibits
establishment of a holding company whose
main business is to control the business activi-
ties of other domestic companies through the
holding of ownership.
Luxembourg Nonfinancial firms may legally be the majority
shareholders in banks. However, general pol-
icy discourages nonfinancial groups or private
persons from being major shareholders in
banks.
Netherlands Complies with the EC Second Banking Direc-
tive.a However, a declaration of nonobjection
from the Minister of Finance is required for an
investment exceeding 5 percent of a bank’s
capital.
Portugal Complies with the EC Second Banking 
Directive.a
Spain Complies with the EC Second Banking Direc-
tive.a However, a nonfinancial firm cannot
hold more than 20 percent of the shares of a
new bank during the first five years of its exis-
tence. Specified shareholder thresholds
require authorization by the Bank of Spain
before additional investment.
Sweden Ownership is limited to 50 percent except
when a bank is near insolvency and there is a
need for external capital injection. In this
case, greater ownership may be permitted
based on the suitability of new owners.
Switzerland Unrestricted.
United  Complies with EC Second Banking Directive.a
Kingdom
a. The EC Second Banking Directive subjects a “qualifying investment” (a direct or indirect holding in an undertaking equal to at least 10 per-
cent of its capital or voting rights or permitting the exercise of significant influence over its management) to regulatory consent based only on
the suitability of shareholders.
SOURCE:  Barth, Nolle, and Rice (1997).
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The Regulations
Tables 1 and 2 summarize, for a selected group
of foreign countries, the main regulations on
firms’ ownership of banks and on banks’ own-
ership of firms, respectively. An analysis of
these tables indicates that, as in the United
States, the majority of countries regulate firms’
ownership of banks less restrictively than they
do banks’ ownership of firms. With respect to
firms’ investment in banks, most countries’ regu-
lations do not impose an absolute limit on the
share of a bank’s capital that a firm can own.
Instead, their regulations give supervisory
authorities control over the suitability of banks’
shareholders. There are, however, a few coun-
tries, such as Canada, Italy, Sweden, and the
United States, that limit the share of a bank’s
capital that a firm can own.
Contrary to the United States, the foreign
countries reviewed allow for limited invest-
ments in firms by banks. Most regulations
define a limit for each individual investment
and for the total of these investments in terms
of the bank’s capital. Some countries put an
additional restriction on that investment defined
in terms of the firm’s capital. For example, in
the Netherlands banks need authorization to
own a stake larger than 10 percent. In the
United Kingdom, stakes larger than 20 percent
are deducted from the bank’s capital for the
purpose of capital adequacy. In Denmark,
banks are not permitted to hold a permanent
participation in firms. Finally, in Portugal,
Canada, and Japan, banks may not own more
than 25 percent, 10 percent, and 5 percent of
the capital of a nonfinancial firm, respectively.
T A B L E 2
Regulations on Commercial Banks’
Ownership of Nonfinancial Firms
Austria Complies with EC Second Banking Directive.a
Belgium Single shareholdings may not exceed 10 percent of
a bank’s own funds, and such shareholdings on an
aggregate basis may not exceed 35 percent of own
funds. More restrictive than the EC Second Bank-
ing Directive during a transitional period.a
Canada Limited to 10 percent of outstanding shares of a
nonfinancial firm, with aggregate holdings not to
exceed 70 percent of bank capital.
Denmark Complies with EC Second Banking Directive.a
However, a bank may not hold a permanent, deci-
sive participation in a nonfinancial firm.
Finland Complies with EC Second Banking Directive.a
France Complies with EC Second Banking Directive.a
Germany Complies with EC Second Banking Directive.a
Greece Complies with EC Second Banking Directive.a
Ireland Complies with EC Second Banking Directive.a
Italy Most banks are subject to an overall investment
limit of 15 percent of their own funds (7.5 percent
in the case of unlisted firms) and to a concentra-
tion limit of 3 percent of funds in each holding in
nonfinancial firms. Some banks, due to their size
and proven stability, are subject to less stringent
limits (overall and concentration limits of 50 per-
cent and 6 percent, respectively, for leading banks,
and 60 percent and 15 percent for specialized
banks).
Japan A single bank’s ownership is limited to 5 percent
of a single firm’s shares.
Luxembourg Complies with EC Second Banking Directive.a
Netherlands Complies with EC Second Banking Directive.a
However, a declaration of nonobjection from
the Minister of Finance is required for any bank
investment exceeding 10 percent of the capital
of the firm.
Portugal Complies with EC Second Banking Directive.a
However, a bank may not control more than 25
percent of the voting rights of a nonfinancial
firm.
Spain Complies with EC Second Banking Directive.a
Sweden Investments on an aggregated basis are limited
to 40 percent of a bank’s own funds. Owner-
ship in a firm is limited to 5 percent of this base
and must not exceed 5 percent of the total vot-
ing power of the firm. These limits do not
apply when a bank must protect itself against
credit losses; in this case, the bank must sell
when market conditions are appropriate.
Switzerland A single participation is limited to the equiva-
lent of 20 percent of the bank’s capital; how-
ever, the Swiss Banking Commission can allow
this limit to be exceeded.
United  Complies with EC Second Banking Directive.a
Kingdom However, an ownership share of more than 20
percent requires the investment to be deducted
from the bank’s capital when calculating its
capital adequacy on a risk basis. Otherwise, the
investment is treated as a commercial loan for
the risk-based calculation.
a. The EC Second Banking Directive limits qualifying investments to no more than 15 percent of a bank’s own funds for investment in a single
firm, and to no more than 60 percent for all investment in nonfinancial firms. In exceptional circumstances, these limits may be exceeded, but
the amount by which the limits are exceeded must be covered by a bank’s own funds and these funds may not be included in the solvency-
ratio calculation.
SOURCE: Barth, Nolle, and Rice (1997).
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Banks’ Investment 
in Equities
The firm-level data necessary to study the asso-
ciation between banking and commerce across
countries are not readily available. The OECD,
however, publishes data that give us an idea of
the extent of banks’ investment in equities.
Table 3 presents some statistics computed with
data for the same countries, with the exception
of Ireland, that were included in tables 1 and 2.
When reading table 3, the reader should keep
in mind that the statistics were computed
using aggregated data and that the variable
“shares and participations” include the invest-
ments in equities of all corporations, not only
nonfinancial firms. In addition, the reader
should also take into account the usual caveats,
such as the differences in accounting rules 
and reporting methods, when making interna-
tional comparisons. 
As table 3 shows, for most countries, loans
represent a larger portion of the banks’ assets
than securities (Greece and Luxembourg are the
only exceptions), and shares and participations
represent a small fraction of banks’ securities.
Banks’ limited investments in equities are also
evidenced by two other statistics: banks’ invest-
ments in shares and participations represent less
than 12 percent of their nonbanks’ deposits and
are smaller than banks’ capital and reserves
(Finland and Japan are the only two excep-
tions).14 Table 3, however, tells us nothing
about the extent of that investment at the bank
level. The data available allow us to study that
issue only for a given group of banks, the group
of the largest banks, and only for a subset of the
countries considered here (Belgium, Germany,
Greece, Japan, Switzerland, and the United
States). Comparing the statistics for these banks
with those for the banking sector in the same
country, it becomes clear that larger banks are
more involved in equities investment than the
rest of the banking sector in the country, though
the extent of their investments is still quite lim-
ited. For example, in Germany and Japan, the
two countries where the largest banks’ invest-
ment in equities is highest, shares and participa-
tions still represent less than 7 percent of the
banks’ assets.
Table 3 is also mute with respect to several
other important issues related to banks’ invest-
ments in equities. For example, on average,
those investments account for what stake of the
T A B L E 3
Banks’ Investment in Equitiesa
Ratio of shares 
and participations to:
Loans/ Securities/ Nonbank Capital 
Country Nb assets assets Assets depositsc reserves
Austria 1,041d 0.509 0.143 0.038 0.087 0.882
Belgium 104f 0.362 0.330 0.017 0.47 0.604
Large banks 7f 0.376 0.307 0.021 0.055 0.787
Canada 11f 0.665 0.196 — — —
Denmark 114e 0.433 0.290 0.042 0.075 0.604
Finland 7f 0.484 0.291 0.052 0.098 1.142
France 413f 0.340 0.188 0.028 0.116 0.844
Germany 266f 0.574 0.170 0.048 0.116 0.902
Large banks 3f 0.541 0.185 0.063 0.132 1.234
Greece 18f 0.270 0.336 0.043 0.060 0.916
Large banks 4f 0.249 0.367 0.049 0.068 1.134
Italy 269g 0.424 0.139 0.020 0.055 0.220
Japanh 139f 0.668 0.143 0.046 0.060 1.387
Large banks 11f 0.650 0.126 0.060 0.083 1.949
Luxembourg 220i 0.189 0.189 0.003 0.008 0.119
Netherlands 173j 0.634 0.141 0.006 0.014 0.153
Portugal 37f 0.333 0.232 0.031 0.060 0.382
Spain 170k 0.411 0.184 0.041 0.091 0.477
Sweden 13f 0.436 0.356 0.029 0.056 0.494
Switzerland 88f 0.474 0.178 0.049 0.106 0.766
Large banks 4f 0.471 0.181 0.052 0.113 0.860
U.K. 40f 0.521 0.185 — — —
U.S. 9,986f 0.634 0.214 — — —
Large banks 100f 0.625 0.187 — — —
a. Data relate to December 31, 1995.
b. Number of commercial banks, except when indicated otherwise.
c. Excludes interbank deposits.
d. Includes commercial, foreign-owned, savings, and cooperative banks and
other financial institutions.
e. Includes commercial and savings banks.
f. Includes foreign-controlled banks operating in France in the form of
branches or subsidiaries. However, branches of banks with headquarters in
other EC countries are excluded.
g. Includes limited company, cooperative, and main mutual banks, central
credit institutions, and branches of foreign banks.
h. Data relate to fiscal year ending March 31, 1995.
i. Includes banks and sociétés anonymes set up under Luxembourg law and
foreign companies.
j. Includes universal banks, banks organized on a cooperative basis, savings
banks, mortgage banks, other capital market institutions, and security credit
institutions.
k. Includes foreign-owned banks.
SOURCE: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
n 14 The banking sector’s limited investment in equities in 1995 evi-
denced in table 3 accords with the results unveiled in Langohr and San-
tomero (1985) based on comparable data for 1981.
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firms’ capital? At what point in a firm’s life do
banks make these investments? Are they made
in conjunction with other services, such as the
extension of a loan or a line of credit? As we
will see in the next section, some of these
questions have already been the subject of




Equities: A Review 
of the Literature
As with previous debates on changes to the
U.S. banking regulation, the ongoing debate
over a relaxation of the barriers between bank-
ing and commerce has focused on the poten-
tial implications of this regulatory change on
banks’ stability. The consequences of allowing
banks to mix with nonfinancial firms, however,
go far beyond that impact. For example, com-
mercial banks’ ability to make investments in
nonfinancial firms would allow them to own
stakes in firms to which they extend loans.
Such investments would influence, among
other things, banks’ relationships with their
borrowers, including the way they monitor
borrowers and the design of contracts that
banks could offer borrowers throughout their
life. These effects would, in turn, influence
borrowers’ incentives, as well as the cost and
amount of funds made available to them.
For many years, economic theory has fo-
cused on the real sector of the economy and
disregarded the financial sector, viewing it as a
veil. The justification was that in a frictionless
world, à la Arrow–Debreu, there is no room for
financial intermediaries. However, the world we
live in is quite different from that envisioned by
Arrow and Debreu, and financial intermediaries
are perceived to play a key role in it. For exam-
ple, Gerschenkron (1962) argues that financial
intermediation influences long-term growth.
Mayer (1988) suggests that there are systematic
differences in performance between the so-
called bank-based systems and the market-
based systems, in which banks play a lesser role
and financial markets are more prominent. King
and Levine (1993) find a strong correlation be-
tween the size of the financial system and the
level of economic development.
Research on financial system design is still
in its early stages, but it has already unveiled
some important implications of certain fea-
tures of a financial system.15 For example,
Dewatripont and Maskin (1990) argue that bad
projects persist too long in bank-based sys-
tems, whereas good projects are cut off too
early in market-based systems. Sabani (1994)
suggests that market-based systems restructure
less financially distressed borrowers than
bank-based systems. Allen and Gale (1997)
argue that bank-based systems provide better
intertemporal risk sharing, whereas market-
based systems provide better cross-sectional
risk sharing. Boot and Thakor (1997) justify
the coexistence of financial intermediaries and
securities markets because each performs a
different role: the former resolve postlending
and interim moral hazard problems, while the
latter facilitate trades by informed agents and,
hence, the transmission of information.16
Research on financial institution design has
sought primarily to explain the existence of
banks.17 More recently, however, that research
has focused on the implications of mixing com-
mercial banking with other activities, in particu-
lar with investment banking.18 With respect to
the association between banking and com-
merce, most of it has focused on the potential
implications of banks’ equity investments on
nonfinancial firms.19 Pozdena (1991), Kim
(1992), and John, John, and Saunders (1994),
for example, show that a borrower’s risk-taking
incentive is reduced when the financier funds
the borrower through a combination of a loan
and an equity stake, rather than through a sin-
gle loan. Santos (1999) studies the implications
of owning an equity stake when funding is pro-
vided by a bank rather than a financier in the
presence of moral hazard caused by deposit in-
surance. He shows that allowing banks to make
equity investments in firms to which they
extend loans does not increase the moral haz-
ard problem. Boyd, Chang, and Smith (1997),
however, reach the opposite conclusion. Key to
their findings is the assumption that banks can
n 15 For an extensive discussion of the literature on the design of
financial systems, see Thakor (1996) and Allen and Gale (1999).
n 16 For additional theories explaining the simultaneous existence
of securities markets and banks, see Gorton and Haubrich (1987) and
Seward (1984).
n 17 See Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993) and Freixas and Rochet
(1997) for an extensive review of the contemporary banking literature.
n 18 See Santos (1998b) and Rajan (1996) for a review of the litera-
ture on the association between commercial and investment banking.
n 19 See Santos (1998c) for a review of the literature on the affilia-
tion between banking and commerce.
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benefit as equity holders of the firm, but not as
debt holders, from the borrower’s behavior
associated with the moral hazard problem
embedded in the model. Their model differs
from Santos’ model in various respects. For
instance, they focus on banks’ monitoring to
control the moral hazard problem, while San-
tos focuses on the incentives driven by debt
and equity contracts.
Rajan (1992) studies the impact of the fi-
nancier’s equity stake on his credibility when
he underwrites the securities of firms to which
he has loans outstanding. Rajan shows that a
possible remedy would be for the financier to
commit to purchase an equity stake at market
price at the time of the new issue. In contrast,
in a model where the financier holds a claim in
firms and chooses to underwrite some of them
to liquidate his claim, Puri (1996) shows that
an equity claim gives him more incentive than
a debt claim to underwrite bad firms and retain
his equity claim in good ones. Berlin, John,
and Saunders (1996) show that having an
informed financier holding both a debt claim
and an equity stake can prevent him from col-
luding with the borrower to exploit the firm’s
nonequity-uninformed stakeholders when the
firm is in financial distress. 
Haubrich and Santos (1998) focus on a set
of issues rather different than those addressed
by the previous literature. They use the liquid-
ity approach to financial intermediation pio-
neered by Myers and Rajan (1998). Myers and
Rajan use the positive and negative aspects of
liquidity to derive banks: These institutions
emerge as a special type of conglomerate, one
combining a firm that takes in liquid deposits
with a firm making illiquid loans. Haubrich and
Santos use a similar analysis to identify the
conditions under which a broader class of con-
glomerates, those combining banks with nonfi-
nancial firms, can be advantageous.
Aside from these theoretical studies, there
is already a large body of empirical literature
on various aspects of banks’ ownership of
equity stakes in nonfinancial firms. However,
nearly all of that literature relates to German
and Japanese banks. Some studies find evi-
dence that bank equity stakes in healthy firms
reduce agency costs. Sheard (1989), for exam-
ple, finds that the bank with the largest loan
share is generally one of the top five share-
holders of the firm. Prowse (1990) also finds a
significant correlation between the percentage
of outstanding debt and the percentage of
outstanding equity held in the same firm by
the largest debt holder; the correlation
becomes more significant in firms where
shareholders have greater scope to engage in
opportunistic behavior at the expense of debt
holders. Flath (1993) also finds that banks in
Japan hold more stock in companies for which
the agency problems of debt are more severe,
and that stockholding induces greater borrow-
ing. As for Germany, Cable (1985) finds that
bank voting control and bank representation
on a firm’s supervisory board are both signifi-
cantly correlated with bank borrowing by the
firm.20 Chirinko and Elston (1996), however,
find that independent firms have more bank
debt than bank-influenced firms.21
Other studies find evidence that bank equity
stakes in healthy firms reduce the incentive
and informational problems, thus increasing
the availability of funding and reducing the
cost of it. Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein
(1991), for example, find that investment by
Japanese firms with a close relationship to a
bank, in the industrial organizational form of a
keiretsu, is less sensitive to their liquidity than
firms raising funds through more arms-length
transactions. Elston (1993) finds similar results
for a sample of German firms by comparing
investment by firms in which banks have an
equity stake, with investment by firms in which
banks do not have a direct equity ownership.
Weinstein and Yafeh (1998), however, find a
less favorable result in Japan. They find that
the cost of capital for unaffiliated firms is lower
than that for firms with a main bank—that is,
firms whose largest lender is also their largest
bank equity holder. 
Still another set of studies looks at the im-
pact of bank equity stakes on healthy firms’
performance. Cable (1985) finds, based on a
sample of German firms, that bank voting
control and bank representation on a firm’s
supervisory board are both significantly corre-
lated with bank borrowing by the firm and
with the firm’s performance. Gorton and
Schmid (1995) also find that banks’ equity
ownership in firms improves the performance
of these firms. Chirinko and Elston (1996),
however, find that German banks do not have
a significant effect on the profitability of the
n 20 Banks in Germany not only own equity stakes in nonfinancial
firms, but they also have proxy rights to vote the shares of other agents
who keep their shares on deposit at the bank. See Mülbert (1997) for a
description of the German banking law on the monitoring instruments
available to banks.
n 21 A firm is considered to be bank-influenced if a national bank or
a national insurance company holds more than 50 percent of the firm’s out-
standing shares or if these institutions hold more than 25 percent of out-
standing shares and no other owner holds more than 25 percent.
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firms with which they are associated. Wenger
and Kaserer (1997) find an even less favorable
result. They find that bank-dominated firms
(firms in which banks have at least a 10 per-
cent equity stake), have a lower shareholder
return than non-bank-dominated firms. 
Finally, some studies have looked at the im-
pact of bank equity stakes on the performance
of financially distressed firms. Hoshi, Kashyap,
and Scharfstein (1990) find that the costs of
financial distress are lower for Japanese firms in
industrial groups than for other firms. In partic-
ular, firms in industrial groups invest and sell
more than nongroup firms in the years follow-
ing the onset of financial distress. They also
find that firms that are not part of groups—but
have close ties to a main bank—invest and sell
more than firms without strong bank ties.22
James (1995) identifies the conditions under
which American banks take equity positions in
debt restructurings. He finds, among other
things, that firms in which banks take equity
positions are more cash-flow-constrained and
have poorer operating performance prior to the
restructuring. However, these firms perform
better after the restructuring than firms with no
bank stock ownership.
As this sample of research shows, bank equi-
ty positions in nonfinancial firms have many
effects that go beyond the potential implications
on banks, though the latter tend to dominate
the debate on mixing banking with commerce.
Some of that research finds conflicting results,
and the robustness of some of its results can be
questioned. Moreover, our knowledge about
many of the potential effects of banks’ equity
stakes in firms is still limited. For example, the
empirical research conducted so far focuses on
bank stakes in well-established firms. It would
also seem important to ascertain the role of
those stakes throughout a firm’s life, in particu-
lar during the earlier stages of its life. Despite
these gaps, it would seem important for policy-
makers to take this literature into account
when debating future U.S. regulation of bank-
ing and commerce.
IV. Final Remarks
Throughout American banking history, regula-
tions have generally prohibited banks from
making investments in nonfinancial firms but
allowed these to own equity stakes in banks.
There were several occasions when banks were
allowed to own stakes in firms, but those oc-
curred mainly before the National Banking Act
of 1864. The regulation of firms’ ownership of
banks has also become more restrictive with
time, particularly since the enactment of the
Bank Holding Company Act in 1956. As a result
of these trends, the United States currently reg-
ulates the association between banking and
commerce significantly more restrictively than
other countries. 
The most recent debate over loosening the
current U.S. barriers that separate banking from
commerce, particularly those that limit banks’
and BHCs’ investments in firms, has, as in the
past, focused on the potential implications of
this regulatory change on banks and the safety
net. While undoubtedly important, these are
only part of the potential effects of that associa-
tion. As the literature reviewed here shows,
banks’ investments in firms have implications
that go far beyond the banking sector. That lit-
erature has produced some conflicting results
and it has not addressed some questions that
are pertinent to the debate. Nonetheless, it
would appear important for policymakers par-
ticipating in the debate to consider that litera-
ture and, through it, the potential impact of the
association between banking and commerce 
on the nonfinancial sector of the economy, to-
gether with the potential impact on the banking
sector and the safety net. 
n 22 Sheard (1989) describes, for various Japanese firms in finan-
cial distress, the financial assistance measures adopted by the firm’s main
bank during restructurings.
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